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Forward Guidance and the private forecast disagreement – case of Poland 
Abstract 
During the period of policy easing in 2013 and prospective tightening in 2017-2019 the 
National Bank of Poland (NBP) applied the forward guidance to manage expectations of 
market participants. The goal of such a policy was to lower the uncertainty related to the future 
decisions of the Monetary Policy Council. We attempt to verify whether the central bank’s 
communication indeed reduced disagreement, based on the results of the professional 
forecasters’ survey. We found that the forward guidance policy introduced in 2013 lowered the 
perceived interest rate risk in both one-year and two-year horizons. On the other hand, 
abandoning the policy in 2014 increased the disagreement in the disproportionately large 
manner. The more pronounced forward guidance reintroduced in 2017 again allowed to reduce 
short-term uncertainty. However, it took over a year to strengthen the impact reducing the 
disagreement especially in case of two-year forecasts. The forward guidance most likely 
prevented increase of disagreement during the so called NBP image crisis in the late 2018 and 
in the first quarter of 2019. Overall our research highlights that it is relatively easy to lose 
confidence with ill-considered communication, but building credibility requires systematic 
long work. 
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1. Introduction 
During the period of policy easing in 2013 the National Bank of Poland (NBP) introduced 
forward guidance as a policy tool. This decision followed similar moves made by major central 
banks including the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of 
England. The new policy assumed communication of expectations about future interest rate 
decisions to market participants. According to the NBP Inflation report the aim of the Forward 
Guidance was to manage medium and long-term interest rate expectations, as well as to reduce 
the uncertainty over policy developments in the medium term (NBP 2013).  
Monetary Policy Council (MPC) continued providing interest rate predictions in the sixth-
month horizon for approximately one year and suspended it in 2014. The Forward guidance 
was reintroduced in 2017 by the new NBP governor and MPC members. This policy aimed to 
trim expectations for rate increase.  
The aim of this study is to verify if application of the forward guidance indeed reduced interest 
rates uncertainty based on the density forecasts of the NBP professional forecasters survey for 
periods from 1Q 2012 to 1Q 2019 (full available information at the moment of writing). We 
found that the six-month forward guidance introduced in 2013 lowered perceived interest rate 
risk in the one-year and two-years horizon. On the other hand, abandoning the policy in 2014 
increased short-term disagreement in the disproportionately large spectrum. The more 
pronounced forward guidance reintroduced in 2017 again allowed to reduce uncertainty. 
However its initial impact was rather moderate. It took over a year to significantly impact long 
term forecast. Overall our research highlights that it is relatively easy to lose confidence with 
ill-considered communication, but building credibility requires systematic long work. 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the subject literature highlighting 
influence of central bank communication policies on professional forecasters expectations. 
Section 3 discusses the content of the NBP professional forecasters survey, Section 4 describes 
the development of Forward Guidance policies in Poland. Section 5 provides methodology of 
our research. Section 6 presents estimation output. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.  
2. Literature review 
The aim of this section is to summarize studies on forward guidance in a broader context of 
communication polices used by the central banks. We present how central banks 
communication evolved during the last two decades and highlight why in this context 
publishing expectations regarding future interest rate decisions may have a limited relevance 
for market participants.  
The studies on communication policies have become inevitable since introduction of inflation 
targeting strategy by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in 1990. Under such regime a central 
bank usually pays more attention to their public policy announcements in order to maintain 
credibility of its targets. Simultaneously the amount of information released into the public 
increases. (Roger and Stone 2005).  
There is strong consensus that introduction of numerical inflation target by majority of central 
banks in the 90’s per se anchored long term expectations and allowed to reduce inflation 
forecast disagreement in the long-run horizon (e.g. exceeding 1 year, see Mankiw et al 2003, 
Levin et al 2004, Crowe 2010), while the impact on short term uncertainty was negligible 
(Cecchetti and Hakkio 2009). Experiences of Poland have not deviated strongly from general 
conclusions. Łyziak (2013) provided evidence that expectations of financial professionals and 
corporate sectors showed strong convergence to the center of the NBP target. 
Simultaneously to introduction of numerical targets, central banks started navigating market 
participants’ expectations trough more detailed discussions of policymakers’ stance (e.g. 
publishing statement from the meeting and minutes, introducing press conferences with Q&A 
sessions). Swanson (2006) showed that increased transparency of Federal Reserve allowed to 
improve rates predictability amongst financial professionals, even there were no improvement 
in forecasting macroeconomic conditions (e.g. GDP, PCE/CPI inflation). Author concluded 
that explicit policy announcements introduced after 1994 also increased response from market 
participants on policy signals from FOMC.  
Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) reported lower volatility of output gap and reduction of interest 
rates in the Eurozone, the United States, and the United Kingdom, after central banks increased 
their transparency. On the other hand, authors do not provide statistically significant results for 
smaller economies (e.g., Swedish Riksbank, Reserve Bank of New Zealand). Furthermore, 
researchers were frequently failing to produce universal rules on the communication strategy, 
e.g., how to manage expectations based on collective and individual communication (Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher 2007, Blinder et al 2008). Similarly, the communication strategies used in 
Poland and in other CEE states have not always resulted in uncertainty reduction (see Rozkrut 
et al 2007). 
Another influential milestone in the central banks’ communication was regular publication of 
macroeconomic forecasts inside inflation reports. Numerous researchers provided evidence 
that central banks forecasts affect private forecasters consensus, especially in the longer 
horizons (Romer and Romer 2000, Hubert 2015). NBP introduced its macroeconomic 
projection in 2005 – publishing macroeconomic forecasts resulted in lower uncertainty 
regarding GDP growth (Kotłowski 2015). 
The financial crisis of 2009 and exhaustion of traditional monetary policy tools forced major 
central banks to create new policies. One of the solutions was to communicate expectations 
regarding future interest rate development to market participants (known as forward guidance). 
Given historical context the introduction of such a tool tended to be a continuation of strategies 
pursued in the previous decades.  
The subject literature describes two characteristic of central bankers’ forward guidance 
(Cambpell et al., 2012; Yates, 2013; Evans, 2017). First of all commitments are conditional – 
declarations do not create legal requirement to fulfil the obligations, but central banks need to 
weigh potential costs related to the loss of their credibility. Secondly, communication can have 
either quantitative or qualitative character.  
Quantitative declarations are published in the form of a policy rate forecast seen as if the 
macroeconomic scenario provided by the central bank should materialize. Probably the most 
popular example of such a projection is the Fed dot-plot, similar forecasts are also published 
by e.g. Swedish Riksbank and Norwegian Norges (both banks presented their expectations 
even prior the Global financial Crisis).  
Qualitative declarations consist of comments in the policy statement or verbal comments in the 
Question & Answers session at the press conference. A few examples of these statements from 
US Federal Reserve (Fed), Bank of Japan (BoJ) and European Central Bank (ECB) are 
presented in Table 1.  
Subject literature distinguishes between the so-called Delphic and Odyssean forward guidance. 
The former one has general character and provides information on what market participants 
should expect in case of no significant shocks. A good example of such a declaration is Fed 
statement from August 2011. The policymakers communicated that rates should remain flat till 
the mid-2013. Odyssean declarations are far more complex. Decision makers communicate 
what economic conditions are necessary to change interest rates. Such declarations were 
introduced by the Fed in its statement from the December 2012 meeting. The Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) highlighted that the policy rate should remain stable as long as 
unemployment rate exceeds 6.5% and the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) inflation 
forecasted by the Fed staff does not exceed long-term target of 2% by more than 0.5pp. 
Table 1: Examples of qualitative forward guidance 
ECB– July 2013 
(Delphic guidance) 
The Governing Council expects the key ECB interest rates to remain at 
present or lower levels for an extended period of time 
Fed – August 2011  
(Delphic guidance). 
The Committee currently anticipates that economic conditions--including 
low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over 
the medium run--are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the 
federal funds rate at least through mid-2013.  
Fed – December 2012 r. 
(Odyssean guidance) 
Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 
to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range 
for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the 
unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one 
and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point 
above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term 
inflation expectations continue to be well anchored. The Committee views 
these thresholds as consistent with its earlier date-based guidance. 
BoJ– July 2018 
(Delphic guidance) 
The Bank intends to maintain the current extremely low levels of 
short- and long-term interest rates for an extended period of time, 
taking into account uncertainties regarding economic activity and 
prices including the effects of the consumption tax hike scheduled to 
take place in October 2019. 
Source BoJ, ECB and Fed policy statements 
Unfortunately, there is growing evidence that forward guidance failed to improve the 
predictability of interest rates. Kool and Thornton (2015) reported similar forecast error in 
Sweden and Norway before and after introducing interest rate projection, which is perceived 
as a mature form of forward guidance. The performance of central banks predictions was 
similar to random walk process. Furthermore, economies where central banks do not 
communicate their future policies achieved similar forecast errors for short-term interest rates. 
More recent studies by Jain and Sutherland (2018) confirmed no reduction in disagreement 
between forecasters on their projections of the future interest rate path. 
Experiences from developed economies lead to a conclusion that marginal benefit of 
communicating future policy moves is small, as benefits of increased of transparency were 
consumed earlier e.g. with projections of macroeconomics forecasts or policy announcements. 
The aim of this paper is to measure if introduction of forward guidance policy indeed resulted 
in lower disagreement of financial professionals in Poland. According to the author’s 
knowledge there were no similar analysis published for the Central and Eastern Europe region 
so far.  
3. NBP survey of professional forecasters.  
This section discusses content of the NBP survey of professional forecasters (further SFP). The 
mentioned publication is the single poll, which aggregates information regarding subjective 
perceptions of interest rate and macroeconomic uncertainty (regarding e.g. GDP growth, CPI 
Inflation). Survey describes overall distribution by the three variables: median of expectations, 
width of 50% and 90% confidence interval. Therefore, it provides much deeper information 
regarding the potential surprises and uncertainty comparing to more popular surveys provided 
by Bloomberg or Reuters, where only median of forecasts is published.   
The SFP report was introduced in the late 2011, but presently the NBP archives full- reports 
from 2012 onwards only. The panel of professionals participating in the survey consist mainly 
of the commercial banking analysts (approximately 80% of respondents), supported by the 
experts from the academic research groups (15% of participants) and the employers’ 
organizations (5%).  
Forecasters are requested to provide their predictions of NBP reference rate, Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with the confidence intervals. Secondly NBP 
collects analysts’ assumptions of the foreign exchange rate (EUR/PLN), oil prices (Brent), 
unemployment rate, wage in the national economy, as well as GDP in the Eurozone (yet 
without providing subjective information about forecast uncertainty). NBP aggregates 
individual projections into a joint distribution (see methodology paper – Kowalczyk et al 2013 
– for further details). 
For the purpose of this paper we are interested in predictions of the annual average of interest 
rate for the next year (T+1) and two years ahead (T+2). The SFP also contains the long-run 
forecasts (indicating the average rate for the next five years) and the quarterly forecast for the 
corresponding quarter year and two years ahead. We do not investigate the long-term forecast 
disagreement as Forward Guidance is usually affecting rather short-term expectations (e.g. 
Swanson 2017).  
The NBP professional survey provides also the forecasts for 4 and 8 quarters ahead horizon. 
We found these predictions as less relevant in the context of policy makers’ decisions 
comparing to the forecast of annual averages dynamics (as central banks typically do not react 
to temporary changes). Dispersion of such macroeconomic forecasts may be affected by 
temporary shocks e.g. GDP forecasts are likely to have greater disagreement for the periods 
following parliamentary elections, introduction of new economic policies.  
The major shortcoming of the survey is relatively short sample - at the moment of writing there 
are 29 observations available. Therefore, previous research often tended to be inconclusive 
(e.g., Kowalczyk and Stanisławska, 2016). 
4. NBP and the Forward Guidance policy 
The aim of this chapter is to describe experiences of NBP with the forward guidance policy, as 
well as to present significant events, which affected interest rate forecast distribution. There 
are six major events in our investigated sample, which need to be discussed in order to 
understand changes in interest rates forecast uncertainty over time. Each of mentioned events 
will have its representation in the final equation.  
First of all, the Polish economy was close to fall into a recession from the late 2012 to the early 
2013. During that time economists presented different views on how strong impulse the 
Monetary Policy Council (MPC) should provide in order to stimulate economy, as well as how 
fast the monetary policy should be normalized. Economic downturn affected particularly the 
one-year ahead interest rate expectations of professional forecasters at the beginning of 2013.  
Secondly, the MPC introduced short-term forward guidance in July 2013. Decision makers 
communicated that interest rates should remain flat approximately in the six- month horizon. 
Those declarations were consistently continued till March 2014. At this meeting MPC declared 
that the rates should remain flat till October. From that time the committee was reiterating this 
commitment, yet without prolonging time horizon of forward guidance. The aim of the study 
is to verify if the MPC rhetoric actually lowered dispersion of the rates forecasts on that time. 
The abandoning of forward guidance resulted in greater forecast disagreement. The rise of 
uncertainty was additionally fueled by fears of the personal conflict between MPC members 
and the NBP governor, after publication of a tape with a private conversation between the NBP 
governor Marek Belka and Minister of Internal Affairs Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz. The Central 
Bank head led an ambiguous discussion on the use of unconventional monetary policy 
instruments and seriously offended one of the Council Members (Wprost 2014). Bloomberg 
press agency columnist Mark Gilbert (2014) stated that this was an example of the worst 
behavior of central bankers in Europe, what strongly reverberated in the financial markets.  
Another episode resulting in greater volatility was related to the change of the NBP governor 
and MPC members in 2016. Prior to the appointment of the central bank governor politicians 
of the governing PiS party communicated preference for dovish executives, supporting 
unconventional easing (Polish Press Agency 2015)  
The forward guidance policy was reintroduced in 2017 to trim expectations of interest rate 
hikes. The NBP president initially announced that the main policy parameters should remain 
stable in the period exceeding one year. Such commitment soon became a usual habit during 
MPC press conferences (see archival videos at NBP YouTube channel).2 From the second half 
of 2018 onwards, NBP president has begun to point that stable rates are plausible towards the 
end of his term (2022), in order to solidify the forward guidance. 
Finally, in the Q4 of 2018 and Q1 of 2019 there were another two significant crisis related to 
the image of the NBP. In November the president of supervisory board of one commercial 
banking group published a tape with a corruption offer from the president of the Financial 
Supervision Authority (KNF). There were an allegations that NBP president participated in the 
process. In 2019 several media outlets commented on extraordinary salaries of NBP 
communication direction and president cabinet director. Parliament implemented a bill forcing 
central bank to reveal payments to departments directors. According to the governmental 
Public opinion research center (CBOS) share of negative opinions about NBP increased from 
7% to approximately 30%, while number of supporters diminished by 10pp (from 55% to 45%). 
The shifts in the opinion polls was bigger comparing to 2013 year with governor Belka tape – 
the speculation about replacement of government were present in the multiple media articles.   
5. Methodology 
This chapter presents methodology of our research. We attempt to decompose interest rate 
disagreement extracting impact of economic uncertainty perceived by forecasters and direct 
effects of NBP communication policies. 
Our aim is to build regressions describing variance of interest rate forecasts made by 
professional forecasters. The uncertainty of interest rate forecasts is assumed to be related to 
inflation and GDP growth uncertainty reported in the poll of forecasters. We also attempt to 
verify, if dummy variables describing events discussed in section 4 have statistically significant 
effects.  
                                                 
2 MPC press conferences are available at: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLE37C73CEC1E1E930 (in 
Polish only) 
Firstly, we discuss the variables that affect interest rate forecast uncertainty independently from 
forward guidance policy events. Following findings of Romer and Romer (2000), and Gavin 
and Mandal (2000), the entry point of our analysis is the assumption that private forecasts 
respond proportionally to changes in the output gap and deviations from the inflation target (in 
line with the so-called Taylor rule). The generalized policy rule is given by the following 
formula: 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝛽1 ∗ (𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡̅̅ ̅) +  𝛽2 ∗ (𝑦𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑡) + 𝑒𝑡   (1) 
where 𝑖𝑡 is the central bank policy rate, 𝑖𝑡
∗ is the long-run equilibrium rate natural rate perceived 
by monetary authorities, 𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡̅̅ ̅ denotes difference between the current CPI annual dynamics 
and the central bank inflation target, 𝑦𝑡 −  ?̅? 𝑡 is the difference between the log of the current 
GDP level and its potential and unobservable level, finally𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are estimated parameters.  
We assume that professional forecasters surveyed by the NBP are capable to estimate the policy 
rule parameters, but disagree between themselves on the forecast values of 𝑦𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡. 
With such assumptions we are able to decompose ex-ante forecast variance of interest rate. To 
achieve analytical solution to the problem we need to use two simplifying assumptions. Firstly, 
we need to proxy the output gap uncertainty by the disagreement related to GDP growth as 
only such a variable is reported in the survey. Such hypothesis does not take into consideration 
the overall risk, e.g., this related to the problem of output gap estimation.  
Secondly, we expect that individual density forecasts for both GDP growth and CPI inflation 
are described with normal distribution. The real distribution is likely to vary over time, with 
possible asymmetrical skews.  
Given stable inflation target and no change in perception of natural rate and potential output 
interest rate forecast variance should be described by the following formula:  
𝜎2𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1
2 ∗ 𝜎𝑦𝑡
2 + 𝛽2
2 ∗ 𝜎𝜋𝑡
2 +  2 ∗ 𝛽1 ∗ 𝛽2 ∗ 𝜌(𝜋𝑡, 𝑦𝑡) ∗ 𝜎𝑦𝑡 ∗ 𝜎𝜋𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡    (2) 
where 𝜌(𝜋𝑡, 𝑦𝑡) is a Pearson correlation coefficient between forecasts of annual GDP growth 
dynamics and similarly defined CPI inflation increase, 𝜎𝑥 is a standard deviation of variable 𝑥.  
We calculated standard deviations of policy rate forecasts, inflation forecasts and GDP 
forecasts based on the NBP professional forecasters survey, which describes forward looking 
expectations. For each single forecast of specific economic variable the survey contains 
information about the width of the 50% confidence interval and the mean of the empirical 
distribution generated from analysts’ predictions3.  
To derive the cross-sectional standard deviation of forecasts from the mentioned dataset we 
assumed that the forecasts in each case were randomly generated from the normal distribution. 
This assumption allows for a numerical derivation of the standard deviation statistic, yet it is a 
significant simplification. The actual distribution could be for example asymmetrical. Since the 
mean of the normal distribution is equal to its median then the 50% forecast confidence interval 
should match the interval between the 25th and 75th percentile of the forecast distribution under 
the assumption of normality. For a normally distributed variable the distance between the 25th 
and the 50th percentile is equal 0.675 times the standard deviation of that variable. Therefore, 
we computed cross-sectional standard deviation of each forecast from the range comprising 
50% of all observations by dividing the reported width of the confidence interval by two and 
then by 0.675.  
Such estimated standard deviations are used as observations in case of explained variable - 
interest forecast uncertainty and explanatory variables i.e. GDP growth uncertainty, CPI 
inflation uncertainty. The detailed description of data is presented in the Appendix 1.  
Subject literature also reports that interest rate forecast uncertainty tends to be described by an 
autoregressive progress (e.g., Kotłowski 2015). We introduce the three-year historical time-
series standard deviation of the central bank interest rate (based on realized data) as an 
additional explanatory variable to account for such dependency. Historical realizations provide 
more information on monetary policy surprises, which should influence the present decisions.  
We also introduced trend as an explanatory variable to verify if downward slope reported by 
Swanson (2006) is still visible in a more recent period. Some reduction of disagreement of 
forecasts was possible not only due to greater transparency of central banks, but also due to 
technological improvements, e.g., development of modern and more accurate econometric 
models. The negative parameter would suggest that such hypothesis is still valid.  
We aim to verify if introduction of forward guidance has an additional additive effect on 
forecast uncertainty. Five separate dummy variables were introduced. The first one takes value 
of one in the period when MPC used announcements about expected changes in interest rates 
                                                 
3 Please see the report at: https://www.nbp.pl/home.aspx?f=/statystyka/amakro/amakro.htm (Polish version 
only). 
(2013 Q2 – 2014 Q1), the second dummy identifies the period when long-term forward 
guidance was introduced (between Q1 2017 and the end of the sample at Q1 2019). 
We also introduce another dummy variable related to lagged effects of the forward guidance 
introduction. The positive value covers the period from 2Q of 2018 to the end of the sample. 
The selected period is not random – in the mentioned quarters for the first time median of 
professional stopped to price interest rate hikes in the two years horizon (in line with the MPC 
guidance). Such tendency was consolidated in the next quarters. 
Finally, some unfavorable events were taken into account with another set of dummy variables, 
namely the depression period from Q4 2012 to Q1 2013, abandoning of forward guidance and 
the clash between the NBP governor Marek Belka and the MPC after the leak of tapes (Q2-Q3 
2014). During the Q2-Q3 2014 standard deviation was 10pp (30%) higher comparing to the 
previous and next events, therefore level shift is clearly visible. Eventual shortening the horizon 
should result in additive outliers in residuals. For further details see figure 1 in Appendix 1.  
Another dummy is related to fears around elections of the new NBP governor and the new 
MPC in Poland (Q4 2015 -Q2 2016). In each of mentioned periods there were an expectations 
of a politically driven rate cuts (despite higher inflation) visible in the central forecasts. 
appointment Adam Glapiński as a NBP governor (first policy meeting in July of Q3 2016) cut 
the speculation about imminent monetary policy changes.  
Finally the last dummy is related to NBP image crisis of 4Q18 and 1Q19. Detailed event, which 
occurred in both quarters are described in the previous section. The complete econometric 
model is given by the following formula:  
𝜎2𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
2𝜎𝑦𝑡
2 + 𝛽2
2𝜎𝜋𝑡
2 +  2|𝛽1||𝛽2|𝛽4𝜎𝑦𝑡𝜎𝜋𝑡 + |𝛽3| 𝜎
2
𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡,𝑡
+  𝛽𝑍𝑍𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡,    (3) 
where 𝜎2𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡,𝑡 is a three-year historical deviation of interest rates measured at time t and 𝑍𝑡  is 
a vector of dummy variables. 𝛽4 is identical to  𝜌(𝜋𝑡, 𝑦𝑡), operator |∗| denotes absolute value.  
The series of 𝜎𝑦𝑡
2 , 𝜎𝜋𝑡, and 𝜎
2
𝑖𝑡
 were transformed with the TRAMO-SEATS procedure in order 
to remove seasonal and irregular factors (Gomez & Maravall 1996). Calculations resulted in 
extraction of the smoothed trend estimates of respective variables. The smoothed variables 
were used in our further analysis. The presence of seasonal factors is related to different 
forecast horizons presented in quarterly surveys. For example, a prediction of an average CPI 
inflation in the next year, released in the first quarter of the current year, requires estimation of 
the state of the economy in the next seven quarters. In case of the survey published in the fourth 
quarter of the year, the forecast horizon shortens to four quarters. Possible irregularities are the 
result of changes in the participation of respondents (the number of forecasters responding to 
the poll varies between iterations). The historical standard deviation of interest rates was not 
transformed (𝜎2𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡,𝑡). 
Finally, all of the explanatory variables (except dummies) were standardized by subtracting the 
mean and dividing by the standard deviation of the respective variable in order to provide a 
simple economic explanation to the constant parameter. The estimate of 𝛽0 should present the 
typical subjective standard deviation of (unobservable) interest rates probability distribution 
during an average economic condition.  
The equations were estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. The Newey-
West method was used to obtain heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors 
of parameter estimates. We also attempted to restrict parameters in such a manner that any 
increase of uncertainty regarding macroeconomic developments and adverse events (𝑍𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒) 
would always lead to higher rates uncertainty. Similarly, forward guidance (𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒) should 
only have positive impact and lower disagreement. To successfully enforce such restrictions in 
the final equation we replaced parameters 𝛽𝑖 with an absolute function of these parameters,. 
Instead of linear estimation of 𝛽4 we use rescaled function 
e𝛽4
1+e𝛽4
, limiting results to range from 
-1 to 1. The final equation has following form:  
𝜎2𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
2𝜎𝑦𝑡
2 + 𝛽2
2𝜎𝜋𝑡
2 +  2|𝛽1||𝛽2|(2
e𝛽4
1+e𝛽4
− 1)𝜎𝑦𝑡𝜎𝜋𝑡 + |𝛽3|𝜎
2
𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡,𝑡
+
𝛽5 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + |𝛽𝑍_𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒|
 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 − |𝛽𝑍𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 |
 𝑍𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  + 𝜀𝑡,    
(4) 
6. Estimation Results 
This section discusses the impact of National Bank on Poland communication policies on 
interest rate forecast uncertainty. We begin with an analysis of the impact on the divergence of 
one-year ahead interest rate forecasts. All the estimates of parameters in section are rounded to 
2 digit figures. Number describing interval range are presented as integers.  
According to our model the standard deviation of the interest rate forecast equals 0.37 basis 
points (bp) in the sample. The value was derived using a square root of the estimated parameter 
𝛽0 which can be interpreted as the sample variance of 𝜎
2
𝑖𝑡
 in the absence of any events 
considered in our investigation. 
Assuming the normal distribution of forecasts, the confidence intervals covering 99.99% 
observations should span over 8 standard deviations. At such level of confidence this range 
covers area of 298bp. Concluding, even under such a conservative level of confidence 
professional forecasters should not believe that any increase or decrease of policy rates could 
be greater than 150bp (150bp is approximately equal to four standard deviations of the 
dependent variable, given the symmetry of a normal distribution).  
Amongst macroeconomic variables, we found historical volatility and uncertainty regarding 
GDP growth as factors increasing subjective divergence of policy rate forecasts. The parameter 
corresponding to inflation forecast uncertainty turned out to be insignificant. Similar 
conclusion was valid in the case of the interaction between the GDP growth and CPI inflation 
forecasts. We were unable to reject the hypothesis that linear effect related to 𝛽4 parameter  is 
equal to zero. There was also no statistically significant linear trend in the data.  
Detailed results of the estimated model (4) are available in Table 2. The third column contains 
estimated parameters of non-linear equation. To simplify interpretation, we calculated values 
corresponding to the linear form in the second column. These values represent a linear marginal 
effect of the dependent variable (as a change in interest rate forecast variance) due to unit 
changes in the values of explanatory variables. Based on this information we are capable to 
present binding conclusions about change in ex-ante standard deviation of interest rate forecast, 
as well as its confidence intervals.  
The forward guidance introduced by NBP in 2013 had a small but statistically significant 
impact on reduction of forecast disagreement. The standard deviation of interest rate forecasts 
was lower on average by 3bp under the forward guidance policy than without this regime. This 
should imply that 99.99% confidence interval was narrowed by 25bp.  
On the other hand, abandoning the declarations about future rate decisions and worries about 
the conflict of the NBP governor with the MPC members (after the tape leak) led to a rapid 
increase of uncertainty. The ex-ante standard deviation of interest rate forecast increased by 
approximately 15bp, implying that 99.99% confidence interval was covering the area wider by 
nearly 120bp in this period in comparison to other periods. Increased forecast disagreement 
sustained for 2 quarters. The rise of standard deviation was even greater when comparing to 
the late 2012, when it was obvious that Poland will soon face an activity slowdown.  
The policy noise prior the appointment of Adam Glapiński as a head of the NBP and new MPC 
members in the early 2016 increased the standard deviation by approximately 2bp. It is clear 
that limitations of the NBP professional forecasters survey could lead to the underestimation 
of the total impact, because there were no questions regarding expectations about 
unconventional policies in the NBP professional survey. Furthermore, the assumption of a 
symmetric distribution of interest rate forecasts is likely to overly simplify our observation of 
the response to the governor appointment event. In this case forecasters were more eager to 
highlight greater downward risks to the forecasts, i.e., the lower bound of the 90% range 
reported by the analysts was lower comparing to the previous quarters, while higher boundary 
strongly shrank. 
Finally, the longer forward guidance (with one-year horizon ahead) reintroduced in 2017 has 
also a positive impact on lowering the forecast uncertainty, similarly to the effects of the FG 
policies experienced in 2013. Our model suggests that standard deviation diminished totally by 
approximately 15bp in these periods in comparison to other periods (without forward 
guidance). However the impact were gradual – nearly half of disagreement reduction occurred 
initially after policy introduction, the impact increased after a year with consistent 
communication of flat rates. Please keep in mind that, the filtered technique used in the model 
is sensitive to the end of the sample instability, therefore strict magnitude of reduction may be 
altered with new data points. However the general conclusions are unlikely to change, given 
the scale of uncertainty reduction. 
The forward guidance also prevented rise of uncertainty during the image crisis related to KNF 
gate. Despite strong accusations and rumors about the potential resignation of the NBP 
president, the reported uncertainty regarding monetary policy did not increased (contrary to 
2014 case).  
Table 2 – One year ahead interest rate forecast uncertainty. 
 
Model parameters 
 
Coefficient – 
linear form 
Coefficient – 
estimation 
Std. Error t-statistic Prob. 
Constant  0.14 0.14 0.01 27.63 0.00 
GDP uncertainty* 0.13 0.13 0.01 9.72 0.00 
Historical rates volatility** 0.02 0.02 0.01 3.08 0.01 
Forward guidance – 6M** -0.03 0.03 0.01 2.78 0.01 
Forward guidance – 1Y** -0.05 -0.05 0.01 -3.64 0.00 
Forward guidance – 1Y 
(from 2Q of 2018)** 
-0.04 -0.04 0.01 -5.29 0.00 
Abandoned FG & Belka’s 
clash with MPC** 
0.13 -0.13 0.01 -11.00 0.00 
Glapinski’s appointment** 0.02 0.02 0.01 2.94 0.01 
2012 depression. ** 0.07 0.07 0.02 4.01 0.00 
Model diagnostics 
R-squared 0.91 Mean dependent var 0.13  
Adjusted R-squared 0.89 S.D. dependent var 0.07  
S.E. of regression 0.02 Akaike info criterion -4.39  
Sum squared resid 0.01 Schwarz criterion -4.01  
Log likelihood 71.62 Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.27  
F-statistic 31.93 Durbin-Watson stat 2.15  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00    
     
Sample (adjusted): 2012Q1 2019Q1 
Included observations: 29 after adjustments 
Coefficient of variables denoted with ‘*’ were estimated with a power function (𝛽2). variables 
denoted with ‘**’ with an absolute value function (|𝛽|) in line with equation (4). In the third 
column we present originally estimated parameters of mentioned functions. In the second 
column, values of linear form were presented to simplify interpretation of marginal effects.  
Source: Authors calculations 
The estimation of two years forecast seems less robust e.g. Durbin-Watson statistics suggest 
some autocorrelation, the residuals for the years 2017-2018 are more volatile, comparing to the 
previous year.  
Standard deviation of the two-year ahead interest rate forecasts at stands at 0.66 percentage 
points and the 99.99% confidence interval of forecasts spans over the 530bp range in the 
sample. This means that forecasters should assume that the total interest rate increase or 
decrease would not exceed 285bp in nearly any case. Please note that the assumption of normal 
distribution does not take into a consideration problem of effective lower bound – the 
distribution can freely span over the negative levels (e.g. -5%), while professional analysts are 
unlikely to present such views.  
Parameter estimates of macroeconomic variables reveal a significant impact of both GDP 
growth forecast uncertainty and the historical interest rates volatility on the ex-ante subjective 
variance of interest rate forecasts (Table 3). The parameter corresponding to CPI forecast 
uncertainty and interactions between CPI forecasts and GDP forecasts was statistically 
insignificant. Contrary to Swanson (2006) we found no strong evidence of interest rate 
uncertainty reduction trend. The parameter slope was statistically insignificant – it does not 
deviate strongly from zero. This result suggests that more transparent communications policies 
other than forward guidance has small effect in Poland – In the mentioned period NBP did not 
introduce major amendments to other policy tools e.g. minutes, inflation projection.  
The impact of the introduction of forward guidance in 2013 has similar effect comparing to 1-
year horizon (reduction of standard deviations was not greater than 3bp, 99.99% confidence 
intervals narrowed by approximately 20bp).  
Returning to this policy in 2017 initially have some positive impact. However again it took 
over a year for the MPC to convince professional forecasters that rates will remain flat. The 
strong reduction of disagreement is visible from the second quarter of 2018, over a year after 
the introduction of forward guidance. According to the model, the area covering 99.99% 
confidence intervals narrowed by approximately 165bp. Please keep in mind the mentioned 
quantity has only indicative character. First of all we do not know if the policy exhausted all of 
its potential yet, secondly used filtered techniques (TRAMO-SEATS algorithm) are sensitive 
when it comes to the end of the sample.  
Table 3 – Two years ahead interest rate forecast uncertainty. 
 
Model parameters 
 
Coefficient – 
linear form 
Coefficient - 
estimation 
Std. Error t-statistic Prob. 
Constant  0.44 0.44 0.01 35.37 0.00 
GDP uncertainty* 0.07 0.26 0.01 18.01 0.00 
Historical rates volatility** 0.05 0.05 0.00 12.41 0.00 
Forward guidance – 6M** -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -3.21 0.00 
Forward guidance – 1Y** -0.06 -0.06 0.02 -3.15 0.00 
Forward guidance – 1Y 
(from 2Q of 2018)** 
-0.17 -0.17 0.03 -5.79 0.00 
@TREND  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.43 
Model diagnostics 
R-squared 0.97 Mean dependent var 0.42  
Adjusted R-squared 0.96 S.D. dependent var 0.11  
S.E. of regression 0.02 Akaike info criterion -4.63  
Sum squared resid 0.01 Schwarz criterion -4.30  
Log likelihood 74.15 Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.53  
F-statistic 110.46 Durbin-Watson stat 1.54  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00    
     
Sample (adjusted): 2012Q1 2018Q3 
Included observations: 27 after adjustments 
Source: Authors calculations 
7. Conclusions 
Contrary to the experiences of developed economies (Kool and Thornton 2015, Jain and 
Sutherland 2018), our research confirmed that application of forward guidance lowered the 
disagreement regarding the next year interest rate amongst private forecasters in Poland both 
in 2013 and 2017. The possible explanation of this phenomenon may be related to 
imperfections of individualistic comments provided by the MPC members. Rozkrut et al. 
(2007) argued that interviews describing views of individual members did not reduce 
uncertainty regarding interest rate forecasts in Poland due to the noise created by pivotal voters. 
Our results indicate that a structured, collective communication allowed to consume benefits 
of greater transparency.  
Secondly, we found a heterogenous impact of forward guidance. In a one-year forecast horizon 
significantly less binding declarations made by Marek Belka’s MPC in 2013 had lower effects 
in reducing the disagreement than stronger commitments of Adam Glapinski from 2017, but 
initially the difference was rather small. It is possible that central banks communication tends 
to be more effective in a more uncertain environment - during the term of Marek Belka interest 
rate volatility was much greater than presently. Declarations from central bank in such 
environment may have greater value to the analysts comparing to the period where policy is 
expected to be stable. Adam Glapinski’s communication policy resulted in the stronger 
reduction of disagreement in 2018, after nearly a year of consistent messaging that rates should 
remain flat in the one or even two year horizon to market participant.  
Similar phenomenon was visible in  case of long-term forecast - communication policy strongly 
lowered disagreement, but again it took over a year for the Monetary Policy Council to 
convince professional forecasters towards credibility of its declaration.  
The estimated models showed asymmetry of reaction between consistent positivistic 
declarations of keeping the interest rate stable and negative events e.g. communication 
incidents or political noise. Events showing the indecision of the Monetary Policy Council 
(e.g., the case of suspending the forward guidance policy in 2014) or shattering public 
perception of the relationship between NBP governor and other members led to non-
proportional increase in forecast disagreement. However the image crisis in 4Q of 2018 suggest 
that credible forward guidance may prevent increase of disagreement during such periods.  
Overall our research highlights that it is relatively easy to lose confidence with ill-considered 
communication, but building credibility requires systematic long work. 
  
Appendix 1 – Variables used within the model 
The aim of this appendix is to present both the explained and explanatory variable. Each of 
series presented in the figures 1-3 were implied based on width of 50% confidence interval, 
published in the NBP survey of professional forecasters. Such data was transformed with the 
TRAMO-SEATS algorithm to extract seasonal and irregular factors.  
The interest rate uncertainty is presented at the figure 1. In the one year horizon, the biggest 
uncertainty was reported firstly during the period of slowdown in early 2013 and after 
abandoning the forward guidance in 2014. The historically lowest uncertainty was recorded in 
2018, under a regime of forward guidance and relatively low inflation.  
Figure 1 – Interest rate uncertainty – implied ex-ante standard deviation of forecasts. 
 
Source: Authors calculations based on NBP survey of professional forecasters  
The figure 2 present GDP growth uncertainty. The short term indicator corresponds to the 
global activity – the highest readings were recorded prior the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis 
and protracted slowdown in the Eurozone (there were a technical recession in Italy, German 
GDP growth for two consecutive quarters was close to zero).  
Similar tendencies are lagged in case of two years uncertainty - greater uncertainty is visible 
right after the bottom of the slowdown. Domestically, there is also an idiosyncratic shock 
visible in late 2015 related to change of government. The transition of power in the central 
bank was described in Section 4. 
Figure 2 – GDP uncertainty – implied ex-ante standard deviation of forecasts. 
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Source: Authors calculations based on NBP survey of professional forecasters  
Finally the last charts present inflation uncertainty. The two years uncertainty is rather 
persistent – we see a benign downward trend visible as inflation globally tends to be less 
volatile. In case of one year uncertainty the dynamics is greater – there are two periods of 
inflation target undershooting in 2015 and 2017. At the moment of writing (2019), the 
uncertainty is elevated due to unclear cost of electrical energy, after a strong increase of CO2 
emission rights.  
Figure 3 – CPI uncertainty – implied ex-ante standard deviation of forecasts. 
 
Source: Authors calculations based on NBP survey of professional forecasters  
In the paper we also refer to interactions between both forecast. There is a positive correlation 
between GDP and CPI forecast uncertainty visible both in one and two-years horizon. The 
Pearson correlation coefficient stays at respectively 0.53 and 0.43 (rounded to a two digit 
figure), what allow to reject the hypothesis that there is no coincidence between variables.  
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